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News School Not Liable for Unanticipated Acts of Student (NY) August 22, 2012 < Back Share to: The Appellate Division, Third Department, has recently reaffirmed the Court of Appeals 2010 decision in Brandy B. v Eden Cent. School Dist., which itself "reaffirmed the principle that a school will generally not be held liable for the unanticipated acts of a third party toward a student" even when those acts may have been planned by the third party. In Geywits v Charlotte Val. Cent. Sch. Dist., the plaintiffs commenced separate actions against the Charlotte Valley Central School District, alleging that they were sexually abused as a result of the school’s negligent supervision. The plaintiffs were first-grade students attending the school, which housed students from pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade. Plaintiffs alleged that the school negligently supervised the students, allowing them to walk unattended from the cafeteria to the bathroom. James Quigley, a high school sophomore, allegedly abused the plaintiffs on multiple occasions in bathroom stalls while the plaintiffs walked unattended. While recognizing the unfortunate nature of the case, the court ruled that the school was entitled to summary judgment because it had no prior notice of similar conduct on the part of Quigley or any other third party. There was no prior notice or indication that Quigley would commit this type of act. It was demonstrated that Quigley “was a good student, had no significant or recent disciplinary history, and had no prior instances of sexually inappropriate or physical contact.” The Court also noted that the school was not on notice simply because the plaintiffs returned late to class on a few occasions, “especially when they explained their lateness by saying that the group of them stopped at the bathroom.” Finally, the court held that the general rule that schools are not liable for unanticipated acts of a third party toward a student was not limited to “circumstances where the injury-producing conduct was impulsive, such as fellow students knocking into one another or throwing objects.” The court found that even planned conduct could be unanticipated from the viewpoint of a school. Thanks to Steve Kaye for his contribution to this post. If you would like more information, please write to mbono@wcmlaw.com .   Previous Next Contact

News Children's Sporting Event Disturbance Lands Dad on TV July 10, 2012 < Back Share to: We’ve all been to children’s sporting events when tempers flare perhaps more than they should and parents sometimes lose their “filter.” The story told in Rossi v. CBS Corp should serve as a cautionary tale and a reminder to all to keep the games in perspective. In 2006, Mr. Rossi was an assistant coach of his son’s Little League baseball team for ten to twelve year olds. His son’s team, the White Sox was undefeated when it played the undefeated Red Sox. After the game, which the Red Sox won, the boys lined up to shake hands. At that point, Mr. Rossi observed what he perceived as a threatening maneuver by a Red Sox player towards his son, the White Sox pitcher. Witnesses claim that Mr. Rossi used some choice words on the perceived attacker and may have even advanced on the player. As a result of the incident, Mr. Rossi was suspended from coaching and restricted from attending games for two weeks. The incident might have otherwise gone unnoticed, but it was anonymously reported to CBS, who dispatched a reporter to investigate during a rematch of the teams just days later. Mr. Rossi did not like the news coverage that ensued and sued for defamation. The court found that the incident was a matter of “public concern,” i.e. violence erupting at youth sporting events. Thus, the court found that the plaintiff had to meet the standard of actual malice. In other words, the plaintiff had to prove that the statement was false and that at the time made, the speaker knew that it was false or stated it in reckless disregard for the truth. The plaintiff could not vault either of these proof burdens, and summary judgment was affirmed. The moral of the story is that, in this day and age, you never know when you can become the 6 o’clock news item of the night. A calm head and cool approach could be best. For more information, contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News NY Courts to Begin Adjudicating Non-Essential Matters on 4.13.20 April 10, 2020 < Back Share to: As we delve into our second month of COVID-19 restrictions, social distancing, and closed courts, we have been monitoring court updates throughout NY, NJ and PA. Our April 3, 2020 update is linked here. On April 9, 2020, J. Marks, the Chief Administrative Judge in NY, issued an updated indicating that, effective April 13, 2020, Courts will work remotely to address pending, non-essential matters. Specifically, the Courts will look to decide pending motions, conference pending, non-essential matters, and resolve pending discovery disputes. The Courts will not be accepting new filings yet, with the implication being, the Courts will address pending backlog before "opening the floodgates" of new motions and other filings which have been piling up over the past several weeks. Hopefully, this Order represents the first step toward a return to normalcy in the coming weeks. In the interim, we'd like to wish a Happy Passover and a Happy Easter to all who celebrate. Previous Next Contact

News Inappropriate Juror Behavior Strikes Again November 4, 2021 < Back Share to: Several months ago, we reported on the inherent pitfalls of social networking sites, such as facebook, in the realm of jury instructions. http://www.wcmlaw.com/blog/Default.aspx?g=posts&t=539 That case involved a Bronx arson trial, which nearly resulted in a mistrial due to a juror trying to "friend" a trial witness. Facebook and other avenues cyber-contact are obviously the most recent and technological means of potentially inappropriate juror contact. Nevertheless, it would appear that good old-fashioned note passing is still alive and well in Connecticut. In the well-publicized home invasion murder trial currently pending in New Haven Superior Court, an alternate juror purportedly passed a note to a court officer, suggesting that the two meet over the weekend. Rather than play it safe and check the "maybe" box, as a few of us may have in the 7th grade, the court officer immediately (and wisely) turned the note over to the judge. Judge Blue called the note a "spectacular display of poor judgment" on the juror's part, but thankfully elected to continue the proceedings, rather than grant the defense request for a mistrial. http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/report_juror_love_note_deliberations_xUOlv2OJVDwdx0VNH4Z8bO The lesson to be taken here is the inherent unpredictability in jury trials. This alternate juror appears to have completely ignored judicial instructions to refrain from contacting persons involved in the proceeding -- in a tragic, home invasion murder trial. If a juror would ignore instructions in a capital trial such as this one, it is not difficult to imagine equally inappropriate, and potentially more damaging juror behavior in a civil action involving admittedly much less serious allegations. To paraphrase former pitcher Joaquin Andujar's comment on baseball, one can summarize jury trials in one word - "you never know." Thanks to Brian Gibbons for his contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News NY Court Of Appeals Sends Shocks Through Labor Law 240(1) Claim November 23, 2016 < Back Share to: We previously reported on the appellate decision of Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, in which the First Department held, over a strong dissent from Justice Tom, that a plaintiff who falls from an A-frame latter after receiving an electric shock from a light fixture he was removing had established a prima facie case that his ladder provided him with inadequate protection. The First Department reasoned that because the ladder was not secured so as to prevent it from falling over if plaintiff was shocked while working, the unsecured ladder was a violation of the Labor Law and the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Justice Tom, by contrast, believed that the First Department was straying too far from established Court of Appeals precedent and their sister Departments, all of whom have held that falling from an A-frame ladder after receiving an electric shock, by itself, is insufficient to establish liability as a matter of law. In Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, the Court of Appeals adopted Justice Tom’s dissent without saying so in so many words. The Court determined that questions of fact existed as to whether the A-frame ladder in question failed to provide plaintiff with the necessary protection, and whether plaintiff should have been given additional or alternative safety devices. The Court cited to its earlier decision in Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. Of N.Y. City for further guidance. Sharp-eyed readers will note that Justice Tom had warned his fellow panel members that their decision had departed too far from the Court’s Blake decision, and that the appellate court needed additional evidence concerning whether the ladder was defective or whether additional safety devices were necessary before granting summary judgment to plaintiff. While we await a new decision from the First Department concerning whether additional safety measures were necessary or would have prevented plaintiff’s injury, the Court of Appeals has clearly signaled that it does not believe that falling from a ladder after receiving an electric shock, alone, establishes a Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Thanks to Peter Luccarelli for his contribution. For more information, contact Denise Fontana Ricci at dricci@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

News Dismantling The Designated Ongoing Operations Exclusion October 29, 2018 < Back Share to: In Tuscarora Wayne Ins. Co. v. Hebron, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court analyzed when a policy’s Designated Ongoing Operations Exclusion may be triggered. In brief, a fire occurred at the insured’s property, when a driver was pumping gas into a vehicle at the insured’s location. The fire caused damage to the insured’s property, and the surrounding neighbors’ property as well. The insured’s policy excluded coverage under its Designated Ongoing Operations Endorsement for ongoing operations including “vehicle dismantling”. On the basis of this exclusion, the insurer commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide coverage for the claimed damages. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of the insurer. On appeal, the insured argued the trial court erred in finding that refueling a vehicle fell within the policy’s language of “vehicle dismantling”. The Superior Court agreed with the insured. As the phrase “vehicle dismantling” was not defined by the policy, the court looked to the ordinary meaning of the phrase, which generally involved stripping vehicles of their parts. Thus, since the only connection the claimed damages had with “vehicle dismantling” was the fact that the fuel, which started the fire, was being pumped into vehicles that had been dismantled, the Superior Court believed this connection was insufficient to trigger the policy endorsement. Accordingly, this case reveals, Pennsylvania courts will look to the actual operations being performed to determine whether there is a close enough link, as to trigger a policy’s Designated Ongoing Operations Exclusion. Thanks to Colleen Hayes for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

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