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News Jury Sides With The Mouse Against Disney Adults In VIP Club Lawsuit September 4, 2024 < Back Share to: ​ At a time when Disney’s legal team is in the news for all the wrong reasons, the House of Mouse has won a victory against a couple who claimed they were improperly removed from the roll of the Mega-Exclusive private Disneyland social club, Club 33. Club 33 is a semi-secret, exclusive club for high-net-worth Disney adults. Located in Disneyland’s New Orleans Square behind an unassuming blue door lies a members-only dining room and lounge where the VIPs mingle and filming is prohibited. Membership in Club 33 is reported to come with a $50,000 initiation fee, along with a more than $15,000 annual fee per person. This is, of course, on top of regular admission to the famously expensive park. Despite this cost, interested parties can wait more 15 years to get accepted into the lofty ranks. Scott and Diana Anderson became members of Club 33 in 2012 after being on the waiting list for nine years. As reported by the LA Times , the couple had made the Club the center of their social life. They brought friends, acquaintances, and business associates. As a couple, they claim to have gone on the Haunted Mansion ride nearly 1,000 times. The couple reportedly spent close to $125,000 annually on Disney outings. It is no surprise then, that when Scott and Diana Anderson were unceremoniously dropped from the ranks in 2017, the couple attempted to rejoin the ranks by any means necessary. This expulsion occurred after Scott was found one night outside California Adventure slurring, having difficulty standing, and smelling of alcohol. This was not this the first time that the couple had run afoul of Club 33. In August 2016, the couple were temporarily suspended when Diana caused a disruption in the Club 33 restaurant, shouting and using profanity. The couple were alerted in writing at that time that “if another infraction of the Club 33 Rules/Guidelines occurs, the Club 33 Membership will be subject to termination.” Accordingly, when Scott was found, apparently intoxicated, their membership was promptly revoked. After Disney refused to allow the couple to rejoin the ranks of Club 33, the couple brought a lawsuit in December 2017 in the Superior Court of Orange County, captioned Carlton Enterprises, Inc. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. The couple claimed that Scott was not intoxicated, and was instead suffering from the symptoms of a vestibular migraine. This condition can be triggered by red wine – one of the 3 drinks Scott admits to having that day. The couple argued that their expulsion amounted to discrimination for Scott’s medical condition. In their complaint, the couple demanded reimbursement for unused membership time in 2017, along with $231,000 – the equivalent of seven years in the club. Disney responded, and cited the Club 33 Guidelines: “Club 33 Membership is a privilege and not a right; therefore, immediate termination may be deemed as an appropriate step to resolve an issue after review of the matter by Club 33 Administration. There will be no refund of either the initiation fee or annual dues in the event of the termination of Club 33 Membership account.” The Guidelines forbid members of Club 33 from public intoxication in Disney parks. The case made it before a jury last month, where Disney continued to state that the Andersons were expelled in accordance with the Club 33 Guidelines. The jury sided with Disney in the matter, rejecting the claim that the expulsion was improper. After the verdict, Scott spoke with the LA Times. “My wife and I are both dead set that this is an absolute wrong, and we will fight this to the death. There is no way we’re letting this go.” The couple has spent $400,000 on the suit to date, but say that they will appeal the verdict. We understand Mickey could not be reached for comment. Previous Next Emily C. Walpole Emily C. Walpole Associate 332 345 2226 ewalpole@wcmlaw.com Contact

News Allstate’s “Collapse” Provision is Sturdy on Appeal (NY) April 3, 2019 < Back Share to: The Second Circuit recently ruled, across three similar cases, that the collapse provision within an Allstate Insurance Co. policy doesn’t cover the cost of fixing cracking in a home’s basement walls due to a defective concrete foundation. This ruling affirmed a lower Court’s decision to deny coverage to three Connecticut homeowners. Three cases filed by Allstate Policy Holders were the first of their kind to reach the federal appellate court. The basis for the lawsuits were Allstate’s denial of coverage pursuant to a clause that disclaims coverage for incidents that stem from faulty concrete used to pour the foundations for thousands of homes in Connecticut. Those homes foundations are now slowly collapsing and the cost of repair is significant. A panel of the Second Circuit held “the collapse provision in the Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy at issue here does not afford coverage for basement walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but that have not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as required by the policy.” The cases are Valls v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 17-3495; Nancy E. Carlson et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 17-3501; and Alan D. Lees et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 18-007, all in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The cases serves as a reminder to homeowners and brokers to carefully read a policy of insurance during the procurement process, and the bring potential issues regarding concerning clauses to light with the broker or carrier before agreeing to the policy. Easier said than done, but here, the exclusionary language in the policy was clear. Thanks to Jon Avolio for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.   Previous Next Contact

News Reality or Wishful Thinking: Is the Admitted Market About to Get Hammered? February 15, 2011 < Back Share to: The softness of the current insurance market has impacted everyone. One specific way in which it has impacted the E&S market is that admitted carriers (to increase premium intake) have underwritten risks that usually reverted to the E&S market. Some professionals believe that the worm is about to turn as the admitted carriers flee the newly written risks because of bad loss ratios -- http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/02/10/184165.htm. The question is -- when? And to that question, no-one knows the answer. For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

Jason Laicha Associate Pennsylvania +1 267 239 5526 jlaicha@wcmlaw.com Professional Experience Jason Laicha assists with a wide variety of civil litigation, defending clients against general liability claims concerning property damage, premises liability, construction defects, automobile negligence, and personal injury. Additionally, Jason assists with advising insurers on a wide variety of coverage matters. Jason’s work includes reviewing complex insurance policies to determine the obligations of insurance companies in the wake of bodily injury or property damage and analyzing the impact of contracts for indemnification. Prior to joining WCM, Jason worked with the office of general counsel for a local school district, a boutique business law firm in Philadelphia, and one of the nation’s top consumer protection firms. In addition to the greater Philadelphia area, he has also lived and worked in Dublin, Ireland. Professional Activities Member of the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel Publications I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Temple University – Beasley School of Law B.B.A., Villanova University – Villanova School of Business Bar Admissions Pennsylvania New York

News WCM Opens London, England Office October 15, 2020 < Back Share to: Wade Clark Mulcahy, LLP is pleased to announce the opening of its London, England office located at: Wade Clark Mulcahy, LLP 6 London Street London, EC3R 7LP England 442081592544 Nestled in the heart of the City across from Fenchurch Street Station, WCM’s London office will allow WCM to better serve its Lloyd’s and London market clients. To staff the office, WCM is further pleased to announce that Jeff Weston, a market veteran, has agreed to become WCM’s London Market Representative. Jeff has been a friend of WCM’s for many years and we are delighted to bring him on board. Jeff can be reached at jweston@wcmlaw.com Previous Next Contact

News No Privity, No Coverage (NY) June 25, 2021 < Back Share to: This third-party action stems from a personal injury action in which plaintiff was injured by a forklift at a construction site. The issue in this third-party action is whether co-defendants in the initial action were considered additional insureds under LaFace’s policy with Selective Insurance, such that Selective would be required to indemnify them. Here, the Court held that for the co-defendants to be considered additional insureds on LaFace’s policy with Selective, they did not have to be in privity of contract with LaFace; however, some sort of written document, agreement or permit had to exist that stated the co-defendants were additional insureds on the policy. The Court further held that the prime contract, which included a provision that Laface assumed all the obligations and responsibilities of the general contractor, did not mean the subcontractor was liable to the co-defendants; but rather, made the subcontractor LaFace liable to the general contractor, EDC, but not directly liable to those parties EDC was liable to. Given that Selective did not provide coverage to the co-defendants as additional insureds on the primary policy, they were not additional insureds on the umbrella policy. Thanks to Marysa Linares for her contribution to this post. Please contact Heather Aquino with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Be Wary of Title of “Subcontractor” in Labor Law Actions July 11, 2018 < Back Share to: In Dan Eliassian v. G.F. Construction, Inc., plaintiff, an owner of a single-family house, hired defendant to perform excavation work to prepare for the addition of a room to the home. Plaintiff did so in his capacity as president of Alliance Real Estate, Inc. After defendant completed phase one of the project, and was off-site, plaintiff visited the property to “inspect the work” when he slipped on oil which he alleged leaked from a defective hydraulic line of a backhoe brought to the site by defendant and used by the defendant in its work. Plaintiff sued defendant alleging violations of Labor Law 200, 240, and 241(6).Defendant moved for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action on the basis that plaintiff was not “employed” at the site within the meaning of the Labor Law, and defendant was not an owner, agent, or general contractor responsible for the work site. Plaintiff opposed the motion with an affidavit in which he stated that he was on site specifically to inspect the work. The lower court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Second Department found that an individual inspecting the work on behalf of a general contractor is a protected activity covered by Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) if the individual can show that they were both permitted to work on a building or structure, and were hired by someone. Here, as plaintiff was on his own property on behalf of his company Alliance to inspect the progress of the work of the defendant, a subcontractor hired by Alliance to perform excavation work, he was a proper plaintiff under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). Further, the defendant’s claim that it was not the general contractor or agent of the owner was insufficient to defeat summary judgment, as a subcontractor may be liable for violations of those provisions if the owner or general contractor delegated to the subcontractor the duty to conform to the requirements of the Labor Law by granting the subcontractor authority to supervise and control the work that brought about the injury. Since defendant was the only contractor working at the site, and had exclusive control over directing the work and implementing safety measures, and plaintiff was merely on site to inspect the progress of the work, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant could be liable under Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) on the ground that it had control of the work site and was delegated the duty to enforce safety protocols at the time of the incident, despite the fact that the defendant was not the owner or acting as the general contractor. As such, the Second Department affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This case is significant in reminding defendants that regardless of the titles assigned to construction companies in contracts (“contractor,” “general contractor,” or “subcontractor”), a defendant may still be found liable under the Labor Law if it had control over, and ability to direct, the work, and control over safety procedures at the project site. Thanks to Valerie Prizimenter for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds That Liability Can Be Apportioned Between Reckless and Negligent Defendants May 17, 2018 < Back Share to: In Straw v. Kirk, Thomas Straw was driving his Pontiac Vibe with his wife and two sons. He was forced to stop the car on the road after the hood latch failed, allowing the hood to open and block his view. Kirk Fair was driving his employer’s Ford F-250 behind the Straws. Fair, who was driving under the influence, was not able to avoid the Staws’ car and slammed into it at over sixty miles per hour. One of the Straws’ sons was killed in the accident, and the survivors suffered serious injuries. They filed a ten-count complaint against Fair, alleging, among other things, that Fair was recklessly driving and endangering others. Fair filed a cross claim against Thomas Straw based on a post-accident interview he gave to investigators of the crash in which he stated that he had been aware of the faulty hood latch but determined to drive his car anyways. The cross claim alleged that, as a result of his own contributory negligence, Thomas Straw was directly liable to his wife, his surviving son, and his deceased son’s estate. Thomas Straw argued that a defendant cannot assert contributory negligence where the defendant was reckless. The trial court granted summary judgment on the cross claim in favor of Thomas Straw, dismissing it because contributory negligence cannot be weighed against or applied to a defendant’s reckless conduct. The Superior vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) in Pennsylvania permits apportionment wherever recovery is allowed against more than one party. These broad terms do not limit themselves to negligent conduct, but rather, leave the door open for apportionment between reckless and negligent defendants. Because Thomas Straw could potentially be assigned a percentage of fault if found negligent, the case was remanded to the trial court so that a jury could determine if he breached a duty he owed to his passengers. Thanks to Robert Turchick for his contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News Can A Doormat In Front Of A Home Give Rise To Premises Liability? (NY) March 24, 2023 < Back Share to: Under New York law, a homeowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in a reasonably safe condition and there is no duty to warn of or protect against conditions that are not inherently dangerous and are “open and obvious.” Courts address the issue of liability on a case-by-case basis and have generally taken a reasonable approach in cases involving open and obvious household items. For example, in Villalba v. Daughney, plaintiff alleged to have tripped and fell over a mat on the front stoop of the defendant’s home. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant and the Appellate Division, Second Department addressed the question of whether the mat was considered a dangerous condition. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Second Department stated that “[W]hether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability 'depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question of fact for the jury'". However, summary judgment in favor of a defendant is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to submit any evidence that a particular condition is actually defective or dangerous". In holding that the summary judgment decision was proper, the court ruled that the mat was “not in a defective condition”, was “open and obvious”, and was not inherently dangerous. This decision serves as a reminder that not all fall down accidents involve liability, and plaintiffs must prove that a dangerous condition existed, and that the property owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence. Household items which are open and obvious and not inherently dangerous should not give rise to premises liability. Please contact Corey Morgenstern with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Employment Contracts In The Third Circuit March 27, 2012 < Back Share to: In Edwards v. Geisinger Clinic, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity to rule on whether a physician had alleged sufficient evidence to support his breach of contract claim following his termination after roughly one year of employment. In Edwards, the physician believed that he was guaranteed employment at least until he completed the four-year program necessary for his board certification. The court rejected the physician’s argument upholding the dismissal of his complaint. The court reasoned that in order to overcome the presumption of employment at-will, a party must demonstrate with “clear and precise evidence” that the parties intended to enter into an employment contract for a definite term. The court noted that an employee’s “subjective expectation” of employment for a definite term does not demonstrate that there was in fact an employment contract for a definite term. Similarly, an employer’s “hope” that an employee would remain employed for a certain time would not demonstrate the existence of an employment contract for a set term. Thus, this case seems to evidence Pennsylvania’s strong presumption of employment at-will and the need to clearly set forth in the terms of a document a party’s desire to enter into an agreement for employment for a set period of time. http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202546842611&Third_Circuit_Weighs_in_on_Physician_Employment_Contract_Dispute&slreturn=1 Thanks to Colleen Hayes for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News Pa. Court Holds That Individuals Cannot "Drink Themselves" Into Coverage. December 23, 2009 < Back Share to: The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Pennsylvania held that an individual's inebriated state did not render his attempted shooting of a woman accidental, and therefore did not trigger coverage under either his homeowner's policy or his personal umbrella liability policy. On March 25, 2005, Dr. Thomas Mehlman spent the afternoon drinking excessive amounts of alcohol at a restaurant. Afterwards, he was involved in a confrontation with Maria Iacono. In a drunken rage, he shot at her three times , and then killed himself. Iacono filed suit against Mehlman's estate, which sought coverage under his policies. Both policies excluded coverage for bodily injury caused by "willful and malicious acts of the insured". The court held that Mehlman's intoxication did not negate the intent on his part to harm Iacono. Mehlman's repeated attempts to shoot Iacono revealed unmistakable intent on his behalf, therefore, the insurer did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Mehlman's estate in the action. http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/east/2009/12/22/106109.htm Thanks to Heather Aquino for her contribution to this post. Previous Next Contact

News 5 Day Mail Rule No Longer Applies to NY Summary Judgment Filing Deadline February 1, 2011 < Back Share to: < ![CDATA[5 Day Mail Rule No Longer Applies to NY Summary Judgment Filing Deadline]]> Previous Next Contact