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News Jury Sides With The Mouse Against Disney Adults In VIP Club Lawsuit September 4, 2024 < Back Share to: ​ At a time when Disney’s legal team is in the news for all the wrong reasons, the House of Mouse has won a victory against a couple who claimed they were improperly removed from the roll of the Mega-Exclusive private Disneyland social club, Club 33. Club 33 is a semi-secret, exclusive club for high-net-worth Disney adults. Located in Disneyland’s New Orleans Square behind an unassuming blue door lies a members-only dining room and lounge where the VIPs mingle and filming is prohibited. Membership in Club 33 is reported to come with a $50,000 initiation fee, along with a more than $15,000 annual fee per person. This is, of course, on top of regular admission to the famously expensive park. Despite this cost, interested parties can wait more 15 years to get accepted into the lofty ranks. Scott and Diana Anderson became members of Club 33 in 2012 after being on the waiting list for nine years. As reported by the LA Times , the couple had made the Club the center of their social life. They brought friends, acquaintances, and business associates. As a couple, they claim to have gone on the Haunted Mansion ride nearly 1,000 times. The couple reportedly spent close to $125,000 annually on Disney outings. It is no surprise then, that when Scott and Diana Anderson were unceremoniously dropped from the ranks in 2017, the couple attempted to rejoin the ranks by any means necessary. This expulsion occurred after Scott was found one night outside California Adventure slurring, having difficulty standing, and smelling of alcohol. This was not this the first time that the couple had run afoul of Club 33. In August 2016, the couple were temporarily suspended when Diana caused a disruption in the Club 33 restaurant, shouting and using profanity. The couple were alerted in writing at that time that “if another infraction of the Club 33 Rules/Guidelines occurs, the Club 33 Membership will be subject to termination.” Accordingly, when Scott was found, apparently intoxicated, their membership was promptly revoked. After Disney refused to allow the couple to rejoin the ranks of Club 33, the couple brought a lawsuit in December 2017 in the Superior Court of Orange County, captioned Carlton Enterprises, Inc. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. The couple claimed that Scott was not intoxicated, and was instead suffering from the symptoms of a vestibular migraine. This condition can be triggered by red wine – one of the 3 drinks Scott admits to having that day. The couple argued that their expulsion amounted to discrimination for Scott’s medical condition. In their complaint, the couple demanded reimbursement for unused membership time in 2017, along with $231,000 – the equivalent of seven years in the club. Disney responded, and cited the Club 33 Guidelines: “Club 33 Membership is a privilege and not a right; therefore, immediate termination may be deemed as an appropriate step to resolve an issue after review of the matter by Club 33 Administration. There will be no refund of either the initiation fee or annual dues in the event of the termination of Club 33 Membership account.” The Guidelines forbid members of Club 33 from public intoxication in Disney parks. The case made it before a jury last month, where Disney continued to state that the Andersons were expelled in accordance with the Club 33 Guidelines. The jury sided with Disney in the matter, rejecting the claim that the expulsion was improper. After the verdict, Scott spoke with the LA Times. “My wife and I are both dead set that this is an absolute wrong, and we will fight this to the death. There is no way we’re letting this go.” The couple has spent $400,000 on the suit to date, but say that they will appeal the verdict. We understand Mickey could not be reached for comment. Previous Next Emily C. Walpole Emily C. Walpole Associate 332 345 2226 ewalpole@wcmlaw.com Contact

News Allstate’s “Collapse” Provision is Sturdy on Appeal (NY) April 3, 2019 < Back Share to: The Second Circuit recently ruled, across three similar cases, that the collapse provision within an Allstate Insurance Co. policy doesn’t cover the cost of fixing cracking in a home’s basement walls due to a defective concrete foundation. This ruling affirmed a lower Court’s decision to deny coverage to three Connecticut homeowners. Three cases filed by Allstate Policy Holders were the first of their kind to reach the federal appellate court. The basis for the lawsuits were Allstate’s denial of coverage pursuant to a clause that disclaims coverage for incidents that stem from faulty concrete used to pour the foundations for thousands of homes in Connecticut. Those homes foundations are now slowly collapsing and the cost of repair is significant. A panel of the Second Circuit held “the collapse provision in the Allstate homeowner’s insurance policy at issue here does not afford coverage for basement walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but that have not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as required by the policy.” The cases are Valls v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 17-3495; Nancy E. Carlson et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 17-3501; and Alan D. Lees et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., case number 18-007, all in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The cases serves as a reminder to homeowners and brokers to carefully read a policy of insurance during the procurement process, and the bring potential issues regarding concerning clauses to light with the broker or carrier before agreeing to the policy. Easier said than done, but here, the exclusionary language in the policy was clear. Thanks to Jon Avolio for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.   Previous Next Contact

News Reality or Wishful Thinking: Is the Admitted Market About to Get Hammered? February 15, 2011 < Back Share to: The softness of the current insurance market has impacted everyone. One specific way in which it has impacted the E&S market is that admitted carriers (to increase premium intake) have underwritten risks that usually reverted to the E&S market. Some professionals believe that the worm is about to turn as the admitted carriers flee the newly written risks because of bad loss ratios -- http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/02/10/184165.htm. The question is -- when? And to that question, no-one knows the answer. For more information about this post, please contact Bob Cosgrove at rcosgrove@wcmlaw.com . Previous Next Contact

Jason Laicha Associate Pennsylvania +1 267 239 5526 jlaicha@wcmlaw.com Professional Experience Jason Laicha assists with a wide variety of civil litigation, defending clients against general liability claims concerning property damage, premises liability, construction defects, automobile negligence, and personal injury. Additionally, Jason assists with advising insurers on a wide variety of coverage matters. Jason’s work includes reviewing complex insurance policies to determine the obligations of insurance companies in the wake of bodily injury or property damage and analyzing the impact of contracts for indemnification. Prior to joining WCM, Jason worked with the office of general counsel for a local school district, a boutique business law firm in Philadelphia, and one of the nation’s top consumer protection firms. In addition to the greater Philadelphia area, he has also lived and worked in Dublin, Ireland. Professional Activities Member of the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel Publications I'm a paragraph. Click here to add your own text and edit me. It's easy. Download Education J.D., Temple University – Beasley School of Law B.B.A., Villanova University – Villanova School of Business Bar Admissions Pennsylvania New York

News Lloyd’s “Custom and Practice” Shield Shattered: EDNY Orders Lloyds’ to Release Attorney Client Communications April 14, 2016 < Back Share to: The ancient dictum – No Man May Serve Two Masters Without The Consent Of Both To The Double Employment – surfaced in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation [Amtrak], 2016 (E.D.N.Y.). And it surfaced to defeat Underwriter’s claim of attorney-client privilege in litigation with Amtrak over environmental contamination and asbestos exposure between 1972 and 1976. In that era, following established market “custom and practice” defense counsel’s reports were routinely routed to Underwriters through London brokers -- and this is precisely why Amtrak contended the privilege was waived. While market practices (to a degree) have since changed, the Amtrak decision is an important reminder that “direct reporting” (that is, from counsel to clients) is the only safe way to avoid an assault on attorney-client privilege. While Underwriters have moved for reconsideration of the order directing the release of what ordinarily would be protected, the case serves as a stern warning that using brokers as a distribution mechanism is a risky practice indeed. In general, to establish that attorney-client privilege attaches to a questioned document, the proponent must establish that the communications were: Between a client and his or her attorney;Intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential; andMade for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. In Amtrak, the attack focused on the second requirement. How could the questioned documents be confidential when they were distributed through the London brokers? Of significance, the court dismissed what it described as “flimsy and unsupported” claims of established market practice and necessity as grounds for overriding a central requirement of attorney-client privilege. We are following this case, but the clear takeaway is this: Adopt a direct reporting scheme for all matters in which you intend to preserve the sanctity of attorney-client communications. For more information, please email Dennis M. Wade at dwade@wcmlaw.com .     Previous Next Contact

News Subway False Advertising Suit Against Quiznos: Amateur Ad (Cold) Cuts Deep January 29, 2008 < Back Share to: Doctor's Associates, the owners of Subway, have commenced a lawsuit .against its competitor Quiznos based upon television commercials created by Quiznos as well as by amateurs in a 2006 ad campaign entitled "Quiznos vs. Subway TV Ad Challenge." Plaintiff charges defendants QIP Holder, a Quiznos subsidiary, and iFilm with making false claims and derogatory depictions of Subway sandwiches. The case is venued in the Federal District Court of Connecticut and will hinge upon the interpretation of the Lanham Act which prescribes trademark rights and the Communication Decency Act which safeguards the internet (commercials were posted on YouTube). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/business/media/29adco.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin Previous Next Contact

News Jury Must Decide Whether Release Obtained by Fraud (PA) December 9, 2016 < Back Share to: A Pennsylvania court recently dealt with whether claims of a language barrier were sufficient to raise issues of fact as to whether a release was obtained by fraud. In Del Pielago v. Orwig, the defendant failed to stop at a stop sign and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was injured and underwent surgery for a rotator cuff tear, and trauma induced carpal tunnel to his left wrist, among other injuries. Prior to filing suit, however, plaintiff signed a pre-litigation release, in exchange for payment of $2,857.92. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. The action was dismissed, and on appeal plaintiff argued that the release should be set aside based on fraud, alleging that twelve days after the accident, an adjuster from Progressive Insurance Company showed up at plaintiff’s home without an interpreter, knowing that plaintiff did not speak or read English. The adjuster presented a check for $2,857.92 and the release, which he scrolled through on an iPad. Plaintiff claims she signed the release, believed that the payment only covered lost wages. In granting summary judgment based on the signed release, the trial court relied on the fact that plaintiff’s daughter, who speaks and reads English, was present. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior court reversed the trial court’s award of summary judgment, finding that it was clearly an issue for the jury to decide whether the release had been procured by fraud, based on plaintiff's claims that the adjuster rushed her into signing a release he knew she was unable to understand. Thanks to Alexandra Perry for her contribution to this post and please write to Mike Bono for more information. Previous Next Contact

News New Jersey Court Analyzes Coverage Dispute Regarding Underinsured Motorist Insurance (NJ) November 5, 2020 < Back Share to: On October 20, 2020, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Penn National Insurance in Singh v. Chestnut. The court reaffirmed the trial court’s decision that the plain language of Penn National’s Insurance Contract did not offer coverage to Singh. On October 26, 2016, Satnam Singh was injured while working as an attendant at a gas station. The driver of the vehicle stopped to get gas and drove away from the gas pump while the nozzle and hose were still attached to his vehicle. The nozzle then struck Singh in the face, and Singh sustained injuries. Singh filed a complaint against the driver and New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, who provided workers compensation coverage to Singh’s employer, APCO Petroleum Corporation. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Penn National asserting claims for underinsured motorist coverage. Penn National’s policy was a commercial automobile insurance policy issued to APCO. Penn National filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. The Court determined Singh was not covered under the underinsured motorist coverage under Penn National’s policy. Singh appealed. When analyzing Penn National’s policy and the definitions noted herein, the Court held Singh was not insured under Penn National’s policy, as he was not identified on the declarations page and did not occupy an automobile covered under the policy at the time of his injury. Additionally, the Court considered that underinsured motorist coverage will be applied when the claimant shows a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained. The Court held Singh did not show the needed substantial nexus and was therefore not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage. This case furthers the importance of understanding the plain language of the insurance policy when determining coverage. Thanks to Madeline Troutman for her contribution to this post. Any questions, please contact Georgia Coats. Previous Next Contact

News Language Must Be Crystal Clear To Get Indemnity (NJ) August 15, 2019 < Back Share to: The New Jersey courts have long emphasized the need for precision when drafting indemnification agreements. The principals of indemnification clause construction were recently re-visited in the unreported decision of Grandview At Riverwalk v. K. Hovnanian At Port. In that case, the defendant K. Hovnanian appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion seeking contractual indemnification from a third-party defendant architect for a $3 million jury verdict awarded to the plaintiff in a construction defect case. The Appellate Court emphasized that, under New Jersey case law, the first and foremost rule of interpretation of an indemnity provision is to determine the parties’ intent. Additionally, any ambiguities are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee. Lastly, an indemnity clause purporting to shift liability for one’s own negligence to an indemnitor is especially narrowly construed and requires “explicit language” to include losses within the scope of the indemnity if they arose from the proposed indemnitee’s own negligence. In this particular case, the plain language of the indemnification clause made clear beyond any doubt that the third-party defendant architects only agreed to assume responsibility and liability for losses caused by the architects’ own negligence. Accordingly, the architects were not responsible for indemnifying Hovnanian for Hovnanian’s own negligence, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed. This case highlights the importance of provision in indemnification clauses. Thanks to Heather Aquino for her contribution to this post. Please contact Georgia Coats with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News Natural Accumulation is Key to Application of “Hills and Ridges Doctrine" (PA) February 7, 2019 < Back Share to: On January 24, 2019, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed an entry of summary judgment in favor of Turkey Hill Minit Markets, the Kroger Co., and D670 Kroger C Stres/Turkey Hill/Minit Mr’s (Collectively “Appellees”) in Brock v. Turkey Hill Minit Markets. The case stems from a slip and fall, when plaintiff Rebecca Brock was walking toward the entrance of the Store when slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot. However, whether the slipping hazard was man-made or made naturally became a point of contention. The “Hills and Ridges Doctrine” precludes liability "where the accident occurred at a time when general slippery conditions prevailed in the community as a result of recent precipitation.” However, the hills and ridges doctrine can only be applied in cases where the snow and ice complained of are the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a snowfall. Therefore, on appeal, Appellant attempted to argue that the accumulation of ice in the parking lot was due to employees of the Appellees plowing and salting the parking lot. The defendant-appellees produced an expert report, which cited that the snow/ice was the result of natural accumulation -- and this report was unopposed by the plaintiff-appellant. As such, the Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Still, the underlying argument in this case is a reminder that a court reading the phrase “natural accumulation” very narrowly could pose problems for defense counsel. Thanks to Garrett Gittler for his contribution to this post. Please email Brian Gibbons with any questions. Previous Next Contact

News NJ Supreme Court Agrees to Review Two Lawyer Conduct Cases September 23, 2009 < Back Share to: Two cases that we previously highlighted on Of Interest have been placed onto the New Jersey Supreme Court’s docket for this Fall. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/calendars/sc_appeal.htm In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. et al., the trial court originally held that e-mails sent by an employee to her attorneys on her employer’s computer were the property of the employer pursuant to its policy regarding electronic communication. Thus, when the employee sued her (now former) employer, the employer was permitted to use the plaintiff’s e-mail that had been extracted from the computer, despite the fact that attorney-client privilege was implicated. The Appellate Division disagreed and held that attorney-client privilege trumped the employer’s privacy policy, and suppressed the use of the e-mail communication. It also ordered a hearing to determine whether the employer’s attorneys should be disqualified or otherwise sanctioned for viewing the privileged communications. The Supreme Court will now determine how to properly balance these two important interests. http://www.wcmlaw.com/blog/Default.aspx?g=posts&t=259 http://www.wcmlaw.com/blog/Default.aspx?g=posts&t=324 In Rabinowitz v. Wahrenberger, plaintiffs originally filed a medical malpractice action against a hospital for the death of their child. The attorney representing the hospital asked the father whether the father's statement to the police about his suspicion of murder was a reference to the baby’s mother. Plaintiffs later sued defense counsel for intentional infliction of emotional distress because of those uncomfortable questions, but the trial and appellate courts found the questions were privileged, that the lawsuit was frivolous, and awarded legal fees to the defendant. The Supreme Court will now determine whether the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel ought to be responsible for paying that award. http://www.wcmlaw.com/blog/Default.aspx?g=posts&t=265 Both cases have important implications for both attorneys and their clients, so be sure to check Of Interest for any updates. Previous Next Contact

News Unwitnessed Accident No Defense to Labor Law January 31, 2011 < Back Share to: In Campbell v 111 Chelsea Commerce, L.P., the Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld the lower court's decision to grant plaintiff summary judgment on her §240(1) Labor Law claim. Campbell was injured when the walkboard of the scaffold on which she was working collapsed. She was the only witness to her accident. On appeal, the defendants attempted to raise a question of fact, arguing that because Campbell was the only witness to her accident, the accident could have been caused by any number of reasons. The Second Department rejected this argument because it was based purely on speculation, and the facts were quite clear that the scaffold’s walkboard had collapsed while plaintiff was working on it. Thanks to Alex Niederman for his contribution to this post. http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_00482.htm Previous Next Contact